The book of Genesis comes to a close with Joseph forgiving his brothers. In chapter 50 verses 19 – 20 Joseph tells the brother they should not fear him,  “Do not fear. Am I in place of God? You thought evil toward me, but God thought for the good in order to have what there is today, to preserve a great number of people.” It sounds like Joseph is saying that even though the brothers intended to do something bad, since God converted their actions into something positive, saving humanity from famine, they deserve no punishment.  But does this make sense ethically? Does the fact that the evil done actually brought about some good serve to lessen the guilt of the doer? If Reuben intending to kill Shimon, shoots him in the chest and then in the hospital, the surgeons in the process of saving Shimon’s life find an undetected tumor which they also remove, thus saving Shimon from cancer, is Reuven no longer guilty of attempted murder? The brothers did an evil thing, the fact that it fit into God’s plan should not mitigate their guilt.

The Sforno solves this problem by explaining that the when Joseph says ‘You thought evil towards me’ he meant that the brothers thought Joseph was evil. So Joseph considers their actions justifiable given their opinion. Though in fact God considered Joseph to be righteous. In any event, Joseph would not punish them for doing what they thought was right. Rashi gives a different but equally creative interpretation. Rashi interprets Joseph’s statement like this: You intended to do evil to me, but God prevented it. Am I in Gods place that I could do you any evil without God willing it? So while Joseph does not exactly forgive them, he merely points out that he cannot harm them even if he wanted to since God controls all that befalls man. There is no point for Joseph to actively seek out their punishment since that is for God to do.

This explanation brings up a different theological problem: Shouldn’t man act in this world and do what he can to fix the world, and bring justice?  Is Joseph a believer in absolute destiny? The argument goes like this, I am about to cross the street.   Either it is God’s will that I survive this crossing or that I die.  If I am to survive, then I will survive whether or not I look both ways before crossing.  If, heaven forbid, I am destined to die, then looking won’t save me.  Either way I can cross blindly.  Does Joseph subscribe to this view? This would fit his decision not to punish the brothers. Why bother? If it is God’s will, it will happen with or without Joseph’s interference.

The question might be asked, but we see God commands man, so He does expect us to act. But this would only require us to act when He has commanded us.  What about where there is no command?  Then seemingly we are free to be inactive.

If Joseph really subscribed to this belief we can explain another troubling question: We see almost the whole Jewish people came to Israel to bury Jacob.  Then they return to Egypt. Before his death, Joseph tells them they will be brought one day to the Land of Israel (50:24). If they were supposed to be in the Land of Israel, why didn’t they just stay there when they went up previously? Or even now, why didn’t they just go there, they obviously had the ability? Joseph is telling them that since God did not command them to go now, there is no reason to take any active hand in getting there. They were supposed to wait for the divine plan to unfold around them. All of man’s actions are futile in the face of God’s master plan. This is also the general message of the story of the sale of Joseph and his eventual rise to power. History is under God’s control.

Is there any role for man’s independent action in this world? Can man ever spoil God’s plan or is his influence limited to areas that are irrelevant to and do not impinge upon God’s plan? The Rabbi Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin, the Netziv, gives us an amazing insight into this question in commenting on the brothers’ plan to throw Joseph into the pit instead of killing him outright. In his Herchev Devar on verse 37:13, the Netziv explains why throwing Joseph into a pit to die is preferable to killing him with an instrument.  The Zohar explains that the pit was full of snakes and scorpions, yet Reuben was not afraid that Joseph would die because he knew Joseph was a righteous man and God would save him. But Reuben was afraid that Joseph would die if the brothers laid hands upon him, why? Wouldn’t God save him then too? The Netziv writes, No, human free will is beyond divine Providence. It can reverse God’s plan. God can choose to override human free will but only exceptional circumstances.  The very meaning of human free will is that we can act even where God would not want us to.  If human free will were limited to acting according to a divine plan (or even within certain alternate design plans), then man really would have no free will. We would be only deluding ourselves in thinking we have free will. Our freedom would be circumscribed by God’s plans.

This question broadens greatly into serious theological issues. First we can ask does providence conflict with human free will?  Then we can ask does omniscience conflict with human free will?  There are those who will answer, not like the Netziv that human free will can never conflict with the divine plan because what ever happens God will rework the plan to achieve the same results in a different way.  That really makes no sense since the plan might be the Shimon will become king.  Can Reuben then kill Shimon? So there must be a conflict at some level, albeit that God can choose the override human free will in certain cases.  So therefore we would need to say there are multiple divine plans, depending on human decisions. We would then be left with a less absolute concept of Providence.

As far as omniscience and free will, there are several approaches. Basically, if God knows what I will do tomorrow, then I may feel I have free will tomorrow to do what I want, I really cannot do anything but what God knows I will do.  We can solve this problem by either negating free will or limiting God’s knowledge in some way. Maimonides chooses the latter. First of all, since God exists outside of time, we cannot truly say he knows anything before it happens since before only makes sense when talking about a being that exists in time. So his knowledge of the future is like our knowledge of the past, neither of which affects the events.  Human future knowledge, as in a prophet’s knowledge, would present a problem, but prophets never have exact knowledge.  A second way Maimonides solves this problem is by saying the God and his knowledge are one, and just as the former is incomprehensible so is the latter. (See Hilchot Tshuva 5:5, Guide 1:57) So God’s knowledge is something we cannot comprehend, and is unlike human knowledge in any way, and so it cannot be a problem theologically. His third solution is that when we talk about omniscience, we only mean knowledge of things that are knowable. In saying God is omniscient we never intended to say that God knows things that are unknowable because they are contingent on free will choices. For example, God knows what is in my refrigerator, but he does not know what I will eat from their tomorrow morning.

In book 5:20 of the Kuzari Yehudah Halevi seems to hold like the last option given by Maimonides, i.e. that knowledge of a future potential does not cause it to occur.

In the Guide 2:48 Maimonides brings the earlier words of Joseph to his brother, “God sent me before you” (45:7) as an example of an action performed by intermediate causes, i.e. the brother, which is nevertheless ascribed to God since he is the primary cause of all.  (See also Hilchot Tshuva 5:4 where God’s will is explained to include the permission for man to act freely)  So perhaps Joseph is telling the brother what they want to hear. He is letting the brothers believe he views this as God’s works, but he really only means it is God’s will for man to act freely.